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In conclusion, it is submitted that the statute in question does not
violate the constitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion. However, it would seem that, in the instant case, the statute
interferes with the mother's constitutional right to determine her children's religion and that the state should not be allowed to assert that
the welfare of the twins necessitated state interference with that religious liberty.
HRBERT S. FALK, JR.
Contempt of Court-Failure to Comply With Court Order to Produce Properties-Inability as Defense
When an individual has failed to comply with a court order requiring him to produce properties, and the court seeks to hold him in
contempt, will his professed inability to obey the court order purge him
of this contempt? Such a case was recently before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, involving an appellant who had been ordered to produce the records of his grocery business. He explained that he was
unable to obey the court order since the only records he ever prepared
were income tax returns which he no longer possessed, and cash register
receipts which he threw away after rats had gnawed them. The Supreme
Court held the appellant had been improperly cited for contempt since
his uncontradicted testimony showed that he was unable to comply with
the trial court's order.'
It is generally held that a contemner's inability to comply with a
court order is sufficient to purge him of contempt, if he is without fault,
but it is often added that the contemner's inability is no defense where
caused by his own "contumacious" acts. 2 The general rule seems quite
of its mother." (Emphasis added) The court said: "We do not attempt to discuss the philosophy underlying the concept that a child too young to understand
any religion, even imperfectly, nevertheless may have a religion. We have no
doubt that the statute was intended to apply to such children, and that in such
instances the words 'religious faith * * * of the child' mean the religious faith
of the parents, or in case of 'dispute' the faith of the mother." Petitions of Goldman, - Mass. -, -, 121 N. E. 2d 843, 846 (1954).
1 Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N. C. 120, 84 S. E. 2d 822 (1954). This able opinion
by Mr. Justice Johnson, after defining direct and indirect criminal and civil
contempts, restates the necessity of an order to show cause in all contempt proceedings except those for direct criminal contempts.
2 Tucker v. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General, 299 Ky. 820, 827, 187
S. W. 2d 291, 294 (1945) : "Defendants [contemners] are correct and are sustained
by authorities cited that the inability of the contemner, without fault on his own
part, to obey the order holding him in contempt is sufficient to purge him of the
contempt charged. 12 Am. Jur. § 72, p. 438 (1938); Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky.
400. 214 S. W. 791; Allen v. Woodward, 111 Tex. 457, 239 S. W. 602, 22 A. L. R.
1253. But where the contemner 'has voluntarily or contumaciously brought on
himself disability to obey an order or decree, he cannot avail himself of a plea
of inability to obey as a defense to a charge of contempt."' Accord: McCormick
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inclusive, but cases interpreting the contemner's "fault" or "contumacious" acts reveal that these are important exceptions.
The contemner's "fault" has been made his plea of inability to comply with a court order unavailing not only where his inability was the
result of "fraud or sharp practice,"'3 but also where he acted negligently.
Thus the courts hold in contempt the innocent fiduciary who fails to
produce trust funds in obedience to a court order, although he is unable
to comply because he negligently made an improper distribution of the
funds, 4 explaining that the law imposes a special duty on the fiduciary
that magnifies his negligence. 5 Even in the absence of any relationship
of confidence or trust an individual has been held in contempt where
his inability resulted from his failure to exercise "due diligence. ' 6 However, this does not appear to be a majority view. "Contumacious" acts
are equated with action voluntarily bringing about the contemner's
disability to comply with a court order 7as where neither a police officer
nor a club owner could explain how slot machines disappeared from
their custody s and, of course, inability so caused is no defense in contempt proceedings based on a failure to comply with the order.
In the North Carolina case of In re Haywood," a trial court ordered
an- attorney to turn over funds to his client which he had admittedly received for the client, but upon the lawyer's affidavit that he was totally
insolvent, explaining that he had been "mad drunk" for eighteen months
v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218 P. 2d 939 (1950) ; Bradshaw v.
Bradshaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133 S. W. 2d 617 (1939).
For statement of the rule without mention of any exceptions as to the contemner's fault or "contumacious" acts, see: U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950)
Armijo v. Armijo, 29 N. M. 15, 217 Pac. 623 (1923). '
For an application of the rule absent contemner's fault or "contumacious" acts,
see In re Scarborough Will, 139 N. C. 423, 51 S. E. 931 (1905), where the contemner purged himself of contempt for failure to comply with a court order to
produce a will by proving that the will was in the hands of a judicial officer who
would not turn it over to the contemner.
'See Maglich v. Maglich, 61 N. E. 2d 507, 508 (Ohio 1945).
'Society of the Divine Word v. Martin, 240 Idaho 1084, ,38 N. W. 2d 619
(1949) ; Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 214 S. W. 791 (1919) ; Messmore's Estate,
293 Pa. 63, 141 Atl. 724 (1928).
Messmore's Estate, 293 Pa. 63, 69, 141 At1. 724, 726 (1928) : "Although not
charged with fraud arising malo animo, appellant [contemner] is guilty of maladministration of trust funds, and this is a species of fraud. He is, therefore, not
in the position of one who pleads inability to pay because of poverty which came
upon him through no fault of his own. The law is not lenient to those in the
position of the appellant .... "
' Bro~wn v. Clark, 260 P. 2d 544, 547 (Utah 1953) (Inability to produce a
child placed in the contemner's custody resulted when the contemner negligently
allowed the child's father to take him from the contemner.). It is elsewhere stated
that the contemner's inability must not be caused by "his own neglect or misconduct." Hembree v. Hembree, 208 Ky. 658, 660, 271 S. W. 1100, 1101 (1925).
" See quotation from Tucker v. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General, 299
K Ky820,
827,v. 187
S. W. 2d 291, 294 (1945), footnote 2 supra.
Tucker
Commonwealth
ex rel. Attorney General, 299 Ky. 820, 187 S. W. 2d
291 (1945).
966 N. C. 1 (1872).
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and didn't know what had happened to the money-except that he had
not applied it to his own use, the court held he could not be adjudged
in contempt for failing to deliver these funds to his client. Although
the North Carolina Supreme Court has not spelled out what "fault"
and "contumacious" acts causing the contemner's inability will defeat
his plea of inability, it can be assumed that the law forbids a contemner
to render himself unable to obey a court order by fraudulent conduct.
Therefore, it logically follows from the Haywood case that in North
Carolina a plea of inability is a complete defense unless caused by fraud,
when proved to the court's satisfaction. Quaere whether the court would
take such an extreme view if presently faced with a case involving gross
misconduct.
Where the contemner raises his inability in defense to contempt proceedings, it is sometimes held that the contempt order must specifically
answer this plea by finding that the contemner wrongfully or "contumaciously" made himself unable to comply with the court order. 10
Once the court has evidence before it showing a court order, as
well as the contemner's failure to comply with it and the contemner's
plea of inability, according to the weight of authority the burden of
proof is on the contemner." Other jurisdictions reach much the same
2
result by saying the complainant has thus established a prima facie case.1
Alabama is a notable exception to this outlook since its courts have indicated that the burden of proof is on the complainant in this fact situation. 13 Similarly, the burden of proof is always on the complainant
in the Oregon courts, but proof of the court order and failure to comply
with it is said to make a prima facie case which throws upon the contemner the burden of going forward with the evidence.14
10 White v. Adolph, 305 I1. App. 76, 80, 26 N. E.o 2d 993, 994 (1940) : "We
believe, therefore, that while it may have been perfectly proper for the court to
find the appellant [contemner] guilty of contempt, before he could imprison the
appellant, he should have found that such a failure to pay amounted to a wilful
and contumacious refusal to obey the order of the court." Accord: Adams v.
Rakowski, 319 Ill: App. 556, 49 N. E. 2d 733 (1943). See Maglich v. Maglich,
61 N.E. 2d 504, 508 (Ohio 1945).
"Wilson v. Wilson, 45 N.M. 224, 229, 114 P. 2d 737, 740 (1941): "'The
burden . . . was upon the appellant [contemner] to affirmatively show his inability
to make the payments required of him.' The almost universal rule is to this
effect." Accord: Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 466 (1939) ; Lusty v. Lusty,
70 Idaho 382, 219 P. 2d 280 (1950); Hays v. Hays, 216 Ind. 62, 22 N. E. 2d
971 (1939); Meisner iv. Meisner, 220 Minn. 559, 20 N. W. 2d 486 (1945);
McCormick v. Sixth Judicial District Court for Humboldt County, 67 Nev. 318,

218 P. 2d 939 (1950) ; Hodous v. Hodous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N. W. 2d 554 (1949) ;
Bradshaw v. Bradsaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133 S. W. 2d 617 (1939) ; De Younge
v. De
Younge, 103 Utah 410, 135 P. 2d 905 (1943).
H2 Ex parte Resner, 67 Cal. App. 2d 806, 155 P. 2d 667 (1945); State ex rel.
utchens v. District Court for Ravalli County, 122 Mont. 76, 199 P. 2d 272
(1948).
3 Robertson v. State. 20 Ala. App. 514, 104 So. 561, 575 (1925); Ex Parte
Gunnels, 25 Ala. App. 577, 151 So. 605 (1933).
"4State ex rel. Matheny, 188 Ore. 502, 216 P. 2d 270 (1950); State ex rel.
Blackwell v. Blackwell, 181 Ore. 157, 179 P. 2d 278 (1947).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently said that the
burden to "establish facts" is on the contemner when he seeks to purge
himself,15 but earlier statements by the court explained that a contempt
proceeding is properly begun by proof of facts constituting a prima
facie case which made it encumbent upon the contemner to answer, without specifying upon whom the burdens of proof or going forward
rested. 16 Under these decisions it appears that the procedure in North
Carolina is not greatly different from that of most other jurisdictions,
because the complainant must first prove a court order and failure to
obey it whereupon the contemner must satisfy the court of his inability
to comply.' 7
There are conflicting views as to the intensity of the evidence required to adjudge an individual in contempt for failure to comply with
a court order, and it is variously held: the evidence must be beyond a
reasonable doubt;18 a mere preponderance of the evidence is insuffici20
ent ;19 the evidence need be only of the greater weight.
A requisite to a valid contempt citation in North Carolina 2 1 and in
some other jurisdictions 22 is the appearance in the contempt order of a
finding upon proper facts that the contemner was able to comply with
the court order he disobeyed.
The most delicate problem arising in the application of the foregoing
rules of evidence is the effect to be given the contemner's sworn testimony or affidavit that he is unable to comply with the court order. If
" Hart Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N. C. 431, 439, 57 S. E. 2d 803, 809
(1950) : "The respondents [contemners] having sought to purge themselves, the
burden was on them to establish facts sufficient for that purpose."
In re Walker, 82 N. C. 96, 97 (1880) : "In cases of alleged contempt out
of the presence of the Court the practice is to have a foundation laid by facts
shown forth, by affidavit or otherwise, constituting a prima facie case, and then

by a rule to put the accused to show cause against the attachment by an
answer denying the alleged facts of which he had notice in the rule or on the
record, or excusing his conduct, or, where the gravamen of the charge rested on
intention, by a disavowal of the imputed purpose." See In re Moore, 63 N. C.
396 (1896).
" For a case where the contemner did not satisfy the court of his inability
after admitting the court order and failure to comply, see Smith v. Smith, 92
N. C. 304 (1885).
'" Robertson v. State, 20 Ala. App. 514, 104 So. 561 (1925).
" Ex parte Lande, 96 Cal. App. 2d 926, 216 P. 2d 909 (1950).
"0State ex rel. Attorney General v. Blackwell, 181 Ore. 157, 179 P. 2d 278
(1947).
"Contempt order was reversed because record failed to include facts showing ability to comply with court order: Berry v. Berry, 215 N. C. 339, 1 S. E. 2d
871 (1939) ; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 213 N. C. 189, 195 S. E. 351 (1938).
2
Loy v. Loy, 32 Tenn. App. 470, 479, 222 S. W. 2d 873, 878 (1949): "A
judgment of contempt must contain an affirmative finding of defendant's [contemner's] ability to pay." Accord: Ex parte Cardella, 47 Cal. App. 2d 329, 117
P. 2d 908 (1941) (Record failed to include facts revealing ability to comply, although it did recite such a finding.); Kinner v. Steg, 74 Idaho 382, 262 P. 2d
994 (1953); In re Burns, 83 Mont. 200, 271 Pac. 439 (1928); Osterweil v.
Osterweil, 133 N. J. Eq. 36, 29 A. 2d 868 (1943) ; De Younge v. De Younge, 103
Utah 410, 135 P. 2d 905 (1943).
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the testimony is uncontroverted some courts rule that it is controlling, 23
as did the court in the principal case, 24 and the contemner's affidavit has
even been held conclusive where the complainant had filed an affidavit
contradicting the contemner's testimonyY2 However, where the contemner fails to make a complete revelation of the circumstances causing
his inability,26 or even without this justification, 27 a contra view maintains that the court need not accept the contemner's uncontroverted testimony but may hold him in contempt. Of course, where there is conflicting evidence the issue of the contemner's inability is for the court
28

to determine.

In the situation where the contemner says he is unable to comply
with a court order, there is an obvious analogy to cases involving contempts for false swearing, for in both situations the court is required to
decide whether a witness's testimony is true. Although such a comparison is not often made, at least one court has punished a contemner
for false swearing rather than disobedience to a court order when he
untruthfully explained his inability to the court,29 thus indicating that
23 Banks v. Banks, 188 Ga. 181, 182, 3 S.E. 2d 717, 718 (1939): "If the evidence is uncontroverted that he [the contemner] is unable to comply with the

order . . . by reason of .

.

. inability, it is error to adjudge him in contempt."

Accord: Hansbrough v. State ex tel Pittman, 193 Miss. 467, 10 So. 2d 171
(1942) ; Lakewood Trust Co. v. Lawshane Co., Inc., 102 N. J. Eq. 270, 140 AtI.
334 (1928).
In Robertson v. Johnson, 210 Mo. App. 585, 243 S. W. 215 (1922), it was
said that the contemner's uncontroverted statement of inability made a prima
fade case for him in defense.
CQmpare the quotation from Lester v. Lester, 63 Ga. 356, 359 (1879), note

38 infra.
2

Accord: Lamm v. Lamm, 229 N. C. 248, 49 S. E. 2d 403 (1948).
Laff v. Laff, 161 Minn. 122, 200 N. W. 936 (1924).
"' Huddleston v. Huddleston, 189 Ga. 228, 5 S. E. 2d 896 (1939) (Contemner
failed to offer information as to an automobile that he owned.) ; Ekblad v. Ekblad,
207 Minn. 346, 291 N. W. 511 (1940)_ (Contemner produced no evidence as to
cost or records concerning contracts alleged to be in his possession.) ; Armijo
v. Armijo, 29 N. M. 15, 217 Pac. 623 (1923) (Contemner did not show the value
of real property that he owned.).
27 Meisner v. Meisner, 220 Minn. 559, 20 N. W. 2d 486 (1945).
8 State ex rel. Houtchins v. District Court for Ravalli County, 122 Mont. 76,
199 P. 2d 272 (1948) (Contemner showed he was unable to make alimony
payments pursuant to court decree because he was unemployed and without property, but other evidence revealed that the contemner was young and able to earn
income; hld in contempt.) ; Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 23 Tenn. App. 359, 133
S. W. 2d 617 (1939) (Contemner said he was unable to make alimony payments
as ordered because he had to support dependents, but it was proved that he had a
job or received unemployment insurance; held in contempt.); Razall v. Razall,
242 Wis. 121, 7 N. W. 2d 417 (1943) (Conflicting evidence as to contemner's
sickness causing his inability to comply; held not in contempt.).
"9Eykelboom v. People, 71 Colo. 318, 325, 206 Pac. 388, 390 (1922). Here the
contemner, an officer in a business in receivership, was ordered to produce letters
concerning the business, but said he was unable to comply because the letters had
"disappeared." In affirming a judgment of contempt the court said: "The falsity
of that justification appears from his own testimony. . . . It is the law that a
court has the right to punish as a contempt manifest perjury committed in its
presence, where the court knows, judicially and beyond doubt, that the testimony
is false."
2
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the analogy is not inappropriate. 30 It is hardly necessary to indicate
that the jurisdictions are not in accord on this subject. 31 One extreme
maintains that a single judge cannot find testimony to be false when
the witness denies the falsity of his statements. 32 A more frequently
applied rule holds that a court may adjudge a witness in contempt for
false swearing only when he admits his guilt, or the court through personal observation or judicial notice knows that the testimony is false,33
and some courts add requirements that the false answer must have a
directly obstructive effect and be pertinent to the issues.3 4 Another view
o See Robertson v. Johnson, 210 Mo. App. 585, 243 S. W. 215 (1922), where
despite court order the contemner failed to produce a diamond ring, explaining
that she had lost it at the theater, and the court held her uncontroverted statement prima facie purged her of contempt, stating: "To find her guilty of contempt
under those circumstances was equivalent to finding her guilty of perjury."
"Ex parte Holbrook, 133 Me. 276, 284, 177 AUt. 418, 422 (1935): "Innumerable citations might be added, but these suffice to illustrate the various positions
taken by the courts concerning the question under discussion. They may be divided into four groups: The first holding that perjury always constitutes contempt
and may be punished as such; the second, that certain other definite factors must
accompany perjury in order to make it a basis for contempt charges; the third,
that it is only when the presiding justice has judicial notice of the falsity of
the testimony that he may regard it as contempt and inflict summary punishment;
and the fourth, that a single justice is entirely without authority to make a finding
that perjury has been committe-d in any case under any circumstances and, on the
basis of such a finding, punish for contempt."
" People v. Richman, 222 Ill. App. 147 (1929) ; Ex parte Holbrook, 133 Me.
276, 177 Atl. 418 (1935) ; Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W. 914 (1912) ;
State v. Illario, 10 N. J. Super. 475, 77 A. 2d 483 (1950) (Recognizing an exception in special circumstances.).
"E : parte Blache, 40 Cal. App. 2d 687, 105 P. 2d 635 (1940) (judicial
knowledge); Wilder v. Sampson, 279 Ky. 103, 129 S. W. 2d 1022 (1939) (judicial
knowledge); Mclnnis v. State, 202 Miss. 715, 32 So. 2d 444 (1947) (personal
or judicial knowledge) ; Lopez v. Maes, 38 N. M. 524, 37 P. 2d 240 (1934)
(judicial knowledge).
The requirement that the court must have judicial knowledge of the falsity of
the contemner's testimony was carried to the extreme in Russell v. Field, 192
Ky. 262, 232 S. W. 475 (1921), when the contemner by signed affidavit had admitted his testimony was false but the appellate court said it was not within the
judicial knowledge of the trial court, reversing a judgment of contempt. A
contrary result was reached in People v. Katelhut, 322 Ill. App. 693, 54 N. E. 2d
590 (1944), where the contemner admitted his false testimony and it was held
that the trial court need not have personal knowledge of the falsity in such a case.
"4A frequently quoted statement of this view appears in Hegelaw v. State,
24 Ohio. App. 103, -, 155 N. E. 620, 621 (1927) : "To justify a finding of guilty of
contempt . . . the following elements must subsist: (1) That the alleged false
answer had an obstructive effect. (2) Judicial knowledge of the falsity of the
testimony. (3) The question must be pertinent to the issue." Accord: Hunder
v. Gordon, 111 Colo. 234, 140 P. 2d 622 (1943) ; State ex rel. Luban v. Coleman,
138 Fla. 555, 189 So. 713 (1939).
Compare the rigid requirements set out in People v. Hille, 192 Ill. App. 141.
147 (1915) : ". . . it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt from the personal
knowledge of the court, or be admissions from the lips of the defendant himself in
open court, and in the presence of the court, and from no other source whatsoever, that (1) the representations so made were false and untrue when made;
(2) that the defendant knew of their falsity when he made them, and (3) that
he made them knowing their falsity and with a wilful and malevolent intention of
assailing the dignity of the court or of interfering with its procedure and the
due administration of justice.
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indicates that a witness may be held in contempt if all the evidence
indicates his testimony is inherently false,35 and the federal rule is similar
to this, but requires that the perjury actually obstruct the court.30
Similar to the principal case are proceedings in bankruptcy or receivership where a contemner is ordered to turn over business records,
property or money, and he attempts to excuse his failure to comply by
showing that he does not possess the articles he is ordered to produce.
The United States Supreme Court has said that the trial court has power
to determine whether there is a present ability to comply with its order
and may discount denials which it finds "incredible in context."3T Our
highest court indicates that a plea of inability "is given credit after
demonstration that a period in prison does not produce the goods,"' 8 a
procedure that bears some similarity to medieval trial by ordeal. After
applying this rule, one state court found that a denial of the possession
of inventory records was "incredible in context" since the contemner
had previously said he possessed the records. 39 Earlier cases in state
courts held the contemner's explanation insufficient where he said he
lost a roll of bills worth $18,000 while "bird hunting in Norfolk County
[Virginia],"40 or that important letters had simply "disappeared. '41
While these cases did not restrict their holdings to contempts arising in
insolvency proceedings, other courts have said that there is a duty on
the contemner making a plea of inability to disclose completely his
"Re Gitkin 164 Fed. 71 (E. D. Pa. 1908) ; Crumnal v. K. L. R. Realty Corporation, 265 App. Div. 22, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 645 (1942) (Court said it was clear from
all evidence that contemner's testimony was false.). See EX parte Blache, 40 Cal.
App. 2d 687, , 105 P. 2d 635, 637 (1940) ; Hunder v. Gordon, 111 Colo. 234,
240, 140 P. 2d 622, 624 (1943).
" U. S. v. McGovern, 60 F. 2d 880 (2d Cir. 1932). Ex parte Hudgings, 249
U. S. 378 (1919), makes clear the requirement that false testimony must obstruct
the court before it is punishable as contempt. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S.
56 (1948), note 37 insfra, and discussion of the Maggio case in the text infra.
"Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 76 (1948).
3
Id. at 76. An earlier, similar statement is found in Lester v. Lester, 63 Ga.
356, 359 (1879): "We cannot say that the judge, under the circumstances, abused
his authority in not accepting the respondent's answer as satisfactory, and in
ordering an attachment for contempt. The attachment will bring the actual resources of the respondent to a practical and decisive test. Pressure is a great concentrator and developer of force. Under the stress of an attachment, even the
vision of the respondent himself may be cleared and brightented [sic.], so that he
will discern ways and means which were once hidden from him, or seen obscurely.
It is a great help to a thing to feel that it must be done, and that there is no
evading it. Harsh as was the old remedy of imprisonment for debt, it had this
wholesome effect in many cases, and was, so far, a beneficial instrumentality. While
the imprisonment which impends over the respondent is not for debt, it can be prevented by the same means as if it were; that is, by payment."
" Dishinger v. Bon Aire Catering, Inc., 336 Ill.
App. 557, 84 N. E. 2d 562
(1949) (receivership).
" Drake v. National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 168 Va. 230, 190 S. E.
302 (1937) (Money was insurance proceeds paid to a business in receivership.).
"Eykelboom v. People, 71 Colo. 318, 206 Pac. 388 (1922) (Letters were connected with business which had gone into recievership.) See note 29 supra.
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financial condition when it is peculiarly within his knowledge, 42 thus
revealing added justification for the insolvency decisions.
The typical case where inability is raised as a defense involves the
husband who fails to make alimony or support payments. 43 He may
prove his inability to comply by showing that he is without money, owns
no property and does not receive sufficient income to make the ordered
payments to hs wife due to sickness, 44 injury4 5 or business difficulties. 46
In some jurisdictions it is not necessary to justify the inadequacy of the
husband's income, for these courts evidently secure to the divorced husband the "unalienable right to starve to death" when it is said they are
without power to compel an individual to work.47 There is authority
very much in conflict with this view, adjudging the husband in contempt when he failed to take the highest paying job available, but accepted employment which paid a lower salary but offered an interest in
the capital, 48 or paid the husband in the form of free room and board.49
Certainly a court order to produce evidence is not "an invitation to
a game of hare and hounds" but an implement necessary to the administration of justice; on the other hand, the colorful observation that
"the devil himself knoweth not the mind of man" indicates that
courts are properly reluctant to determine summarily the truth of a contemner's testimony. Granting the propriety of broad powers in the
court to protect its processes against those who do not respect them, the
writer believes some protection should be afforded the individual. Accordingly, where an individual has failed to comply with a court order
but professes his inability to obey it, it is suggested that the better policy
under constitutional safeguards would require that there be evidence
tendered to the court, or facts within the court's personal knowledge,

showing the individual's testimony to be untrue, or that his inability
resulted from his own misconduct or "contumacious" acts.
Roy W. DAVIs, JR.
State ex rel. Blackwell v. Blackwell, 181 Ore. 157, 164, 179 P. 2d 278, 281
(1947) : "The financial condition of defendant was a matter peculiarly within his
own knowledge, and, when charged with failure to comply with the decree of the
court as to payment of money, it was incumbent upon him, if seeking to excuse
his failure to make payments, to make a full and complete disclosure of the facts
showing his inability to pay." See Laff v. Laff, 161 Minn. 122, 200 N. W. 936
(1924).
"In Ex parte Risner, 67 Cal. App. 2d 806, 155 P. 2d 667 (1945), a contempt
judgment was upheld in habeas corpus proceedings, where a wife had failed to
comply with a court decree ordering her to make alimony payments to her
husband. Is this a straw in the wind?
"Razall v. Razall, 242 Wis. 121, 7 N. W. 2d 417 (1943).
"Caffrey v. Caffrey, 4 F. 2d 952 (D. C. Cir. 1925)_.
O Chong v. Chong, 35 Hawaii 541 (1940).
,7 Id. at 544: "This conclusion is in harmony with the authorities which do
not recognize the right of a court in cases of this kind to control a man's economic
ventures, although insistent that if he is able he shall obey the orders of the court."
R Osmers v. Osmers, 114 Utah 216, 198 P. 2d 233 (1948).
"State ex rel. Houtchens v. District Court for Ravalli County, 122 Mont. 76,
199 P. 2d 272 (1948).
4

